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Abstract 
 
This paper articulates a dialogue between Edward Casey, Cheng Chung-ying and me that 
began at the Eastern Division annual meeting in Philadelphia of the American 
Philosophical Association, in a session sponsored by the International Society for 
Chinese Philosophy.  There we read brief versions of the papers presented in this issue 
and commented on one another.  Casey represented Continental phenomenology, Cheng 
the Chinese tradition as he has developed in into onto-generativel hermeneutics, and I the 
melding of American pragmatic and Confucian traditions that I have been developing. 
This paper begins by contrasting the experiential frames within which pragmatism and 
Continental phenomenology work, elaborating in some detail the pragmatic theory of 
interpretive interaction.  This is contrasted with the orientation to consciousness generally 
held by Continental philosophers.  The paper argues that pragmatism and Confucianism 
are close on many aspects of this contrast, and especially on their common views that 
values are encountered in the world through experience and that the experiencing self is a 
product, not a condition, of experience.  The paper then develops a comparative 
pragmatic-Confucian theory of the self, emphasizing the roles of pragmatic semiotics and 
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Confucian ritual theory, the individuating role of ritual playing, the context of human 
development and interaction in matrices of rituals, the importance of sincerity in ritual 
playing, and the tragedy of human failure to have rituals in which the achievement of 
sincerity is almost miraculous.  Cheng and Casey are engaged throughout as friends, an 
appropriate ritual context for philosophical dialogue. 
 
 
I. Experiential Frames: Pragmatism and Phenomenology 
 
 The American pragmatic tradition that I espouse and work to extend regards human 
experience as interactions of persons with their environments.1  This is a fundamentally different 
frame for experience from the transcendental frame common in most forms of European 
phenomenology, as will become clear in what follows. It can rather neatly be mapped onto many 
themes in Confucian approaches to experience, as Roger Ames and David Hall have argued.2 
Experiential interactions are interpretive in the sense that they employ signs to grasp the 
environmental elements in certain respects.3  Hence the interpretations are always triadic, taking 
the signs to represent the objects interpreted in the respects as interpreted by the interpreter.  As 
Charles S. Peirce said, the basic form of interpretation is that the interpretation takes the object to 
be as represented by the sign in a certain respect, for instance, as in interpreting a barn to be red 
in respect of color.4   
 The selection of the respect in which to interpret the environment is always a function of 
valuation, taking that respect to be the relevantly important one.5  The valuation might be 
significantly biological, as in the quick flight that interprets a rustling in the bush with the sign of 
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danger: the interpretive flight precedes analysis of the sound or even consciousness of the 
potentially dangerous situation.  Such biological valuations have evolutionary adaptive value: 
persons who flee first and inquire second stand a better chance of living to pass on their timorous 
genes than those who look first to see whether the noise was made by a tiger and don’t live to 
pass on any genes.   
Most human experience is guided also by values built in to the culture and made into 
habits of daily life, indicating what is important to notice and respond to in typical environments, 
shaping the quotidian day.  These include interactions that are more responsive as well as those 
that are more active and directed.  Some of these come to consciousness but most do not unless 
the interactions are misguided by the habitual signs.  For instance, we usually do not notice the 
furniture when walking through a familiar room unless something is out of place and we bump it.   
 Much of human experience is guided by values that involve explicit purposes that are 
more or less conscious.  Sometimes we greet friends not only out of habit but with sincere 
interest; sometimes we purposely seek for a strategy to act in order to deal with a difficult person 
or situation.  Sometimes we sit down to write papers and organize our hours around intellectual 
inquiry.  Sometimes we move vigorously in order to get exercise.  Most of the time, we are 
making many interpretations all at once, with shifting phases of conscious attention.  A short 
time ago on my morning walk I was reflecting with good, nostalgic feelings about being on this 
panel with my old friends, Ed and Chungying (I also was thinking about Linyu but she is not 
old!); these reflections were interspersed with wonderings about what I should say, and what 
they were likely to say, a kind of easy musement that shifted among the intellectual and personal 
elements.6  Then I got to the big hill and suddenly became aware of my heavy breathing and 
concentrated on raising my heart rate.  Until then, the interpretive habits of my walking 
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engagements of the environment were pretty much unnoticed.  All through the walk I was taking 
appreciative stock of the beautiful neighborhood near my home, admiring the trees and many of 
the houses, and nodding to an occasional neighbor.  Simultaneously, then, I was interpreting the 
aesthetic qualities of my neighborhood, walking for the sake of exercise, attending to my body’s 
needs and habits, thinking about philosophical issues, reflecting on the different paths my friends 
and I have taken, and delighting in the memories of friendship. 
 Different values, and values of different sorts, guide the multiplicity of congruent 
interactions involved in my walk.  Among the most important are those that parse the 
“environment” into foreground and background elements.  The foreground elements are the 
objects of an interpretive engagement, but objects always as set within backgrounds.  Each of the 
interpretive interactions on my walk identifies my environment differently regarding foreground 
and background.  Sometimes the foreground is where I’m stepping.  Sometimes it is memories of 
Ed’s adroit knowledge of Whitehead, someone Continental philosopher should be ashamed to 
have, sometimes it’s Chung-ying’s impassioned insistence that I could be a Confucian despite 
my ethnic distance.  Moreover, the configurations of foreground and background are constantly 
changing. Sometimes the changes are caused by arising attractions and repulsions.  Often, 
however, they are caused by interruptions, something the pragmatist Charles Peirce called 
Secondness, a kind of brute opposition that interrupts the continuous operations of habits, and 
that will be described below.  Conscious attention is highly sensitive to interruptions.   
 On this pragmatic model of experience as multileveled and dynamic interpretive 
interactions and engagements, it is plain that value is involved in the environments as well as in 
the interpreters.  On the side of the interpreter, value is involved in the selection of respects of 
interpretation.  At the same time these personal valuations are good or bad insofar as they 
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recognize what is important in the environment.  The real value resides in the environment in 
correlation with what human beings can apprehend and respond to.  A tiger in the rustling bush is 
really bad for the slow-to-flee interpreters and their potential progeny.  An environmental 
disaster would make my walk through town horrific. The structure of the environment is what 
contains the values we more or less relevantly learn to recognize, and our experience is shaped 
by signs that are more or less in accordance with the “affordances” of the environment to fit our 
valuing habits.  “Affordances,” a term introduced into psychological thinking by J. J. Gibson, 
means the ways by which environments are structured in complex way that afford being 
interpreted with the resources and interests of an interpreter’s semiotic system.  The walker in the 
jungle interprets the whole situation of noise in the bush at once.  The value in the interpreter’s 
intentional sign-filled interpretation is matched more or less by the structure of the environment.  
People, of course, want to develop value-laden interpretive structures that pick up on what is 
important in the environment. 7  Nathaniel Barrett is developing pragmatic models for cognitive 
science employing the notion of affordances, although the point would have been recognized by 
Peirce and the other pragmatists.8 
 This pragmatic valuational experiential model is different from the dominant model of 
phenomenology in Continental philosophy, from which both Cheng and Casey pick their major 
cues.  Broadly speaking, the Continental tradition follows Kant in supposing that experience is 
what is in consciousness and its subconscious layers and that this makes possible the project of 
describing consciousness.  Phenomenology is description of experience for this tradition, 
description deep and multilayered.  No one has explored the subtleties of consciousness in a 
descriptive mode more than Ed, and Chungying is looming large with a descriptive ontology 
from the Yijing!9 
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 My pragmatic trajectory says that experience is not especially a matter of consciousness 
but rather of interpretive interaction.  Peirce argued, conclusively to my mind, that there is no 
such thing as intuitive consciousness but rather that what we think we see and hear in 
consciousness is a matter of inference when you come down to it.  He showed that our sense of 
the seemingly continuous visual field fills in inferentially all the spots that don’t register where 
the optic nerves enter the eyes and no rods and cones can pick up anything.10  Nothing is simply 
given, only selectively taken in a complex environment of multilayered interpretations with a lot 
of corrective interruptions or Secondness thrown in.  
 Because consciousness is a vagrant and often ephemeral aspect of experience, pragmatic 
phenomenology cannot be something controlled by ideals of description.  Hegelian 
phenomenology described the appearances of the rational advance of consciousness through the 
dialectic of Spirit (Geist). Value or importance, for Hegel, is defined by the place in the dialectic. 
Husserlian phenomenology bracketed claims to say what is real and important in order to 
describe accurately the forms of consciousness.  If things appear in consciousness as carrying 
one value or another, this is just a matter of their form and indicates nothing about what is really 
important.  Later phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty recognized the limitation of 
the consciousness model and worked hard to articulate experience through the body.11  Two 
students of Professor Casey and me have developed this even further.  Drew Leder’s The Absent 
Body is an important defense of body-thinking in critical dialogue with the Cartesian tradition.12 
David Strong’s Crazy Mountains: Learning from Wilderness to Weigh Technology develops a 
bodily sense of perception of value that goes so far as to engage mountains in climbing. 13 The 
point about perceptual experience through the body place these phenomenologists close to 
William James.  But whereas James held to a metaphysical “neutral monism” according to which 
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the neutral experience stuff can be organized either according to subjective selves or according to 
logical structures in the environment, with the result that the self is just as much a contingent 
construct as a mountain viewed from many angles, Merleau-Ponty, Leder, and Strong treat the 
body as a medium for a self to engage objects of appreciative perception.  Heidegger was aware 
of transcendental philosophy’s hidden commitment to construing the world as a function of the 
self’s synthesizing activities, and struggled in contrast to define phenomenology as the world 
“coming across the open” to us (Daseins).  But he never escaped the priority of Dasein as the 
subjective condition for experience.14 
 The pragmatic model of valuationally ordered interpretive and interactive engagement is 
radically different.  The self and its first-person perspective is just as much a product of ongoing 
interpretive interactions as any representation of the world engaged, not the apriori or 
transcendental condition for the interpretive interactions.  On this pragmatic model, 
phenomenology, in Peirce’s use of the term, is not description but rather classification of things 
engaged or interacted with, including the “”interacters,” according to basic categories. Peirce 
argued that all things encountered or supposed in any way can be classified in one or several of 
three categories. 15  For Peirce, all things have an immediate character, perhaps as experienced 
but always as simply being what they are. The immediacy of qualities is included here.  This is 
Firstness. Because the Firstness of things is in-itself or immediate, qualities or things as Firsts do 
not differ from one another because they cannot be compared.  We can never interpret something 
as a First without mediating it.  Secondness is the oppositional quality of things, their in-
itselfness and resistance to being absorbed into others.  One of Peirce’s examples is the feeling of 
someone pushing against you on the other side of a door; interpreting this as opposition is more 
than Secondness, but the opposition itself is a Second.  Another of Peirce’s (more fanciful) 
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examples is the experience of floating in a hot-air balloon above a city in the dead quite of night 
when a shrieking factory whistle goes off; interpreting it by jumping is more than Secondness, 
but the shock is a Second. Secondness is the source of reality’s correction of our bad signs and 
habits.  Peirce’s criticism of Hegel was that the latter swallowed up Secondness in interpretive 
Thirdness, losing the sense of reality over against all interpretation; I think he would make the 
same criticism of signified/signifier semiotics. Thirdness is the mediation of things so that they 
are brought together in some respects, related while maintaining their differences.  All signs are 
Thirds, for Peirce.  They have their own-being, Firstness, and their oppositional differences from 
other things, their Secondness.  But their Thirdness consists in their mediating functions. Only 
things that are Thirds can be interpreted.  Indeed, only things that are Thirds can be 
determinately what they are and different from other determinate things in some respect.  There 
can be no Firsts alone, or Seconds alone, or Firsts and Seconds together, although Peirce 
speculated that an evolutionary metaphysics might move from Firsts to Seconds to Thirds.  If 
there is anything determinate, it is a Third that is what it is (its Firstness) over against something 
different (its Secondness) mediating in some respect (its Thirdness).  Experience as interpretive 
interaction is primarily a function of Thirdness, although the realities interpreted have their 
corrective secondness and all experience has the qualitative immediacy of firstness. 
 
 
II. Interactive Experience and Ritual: The Western Contribution of Confucianism 
 Contributing to this conversation with Casey the Continental phenomenologist and Cheng 
the Chinese philosopher, I want to say that Confucianism supposes experience to be very much 
what the pragmatists (especially I as a late pragmatist) affirm.  Human life is interactive and 
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responsive, grasping things as having value and responding valuationally, appreciative in 
positive and negative senses and struggling to improve interpretive reactions.  I have focused my 
discussion so far on Peirce because he had an explicit “phenomenology,” to which I will return 
shortly.  But James and Dewey have even more detail about experience that resonates with the 
Confucian tradition.  Moreover, Whitehead too can be counted as a pragmatist and he leads to 
even more comparative connections with Confucianism. Those points are for another time. 
Buddhism, with its many approaches to interpreting consciousness, is much closer to Husserlian 
phenomenology and I am willing to give Buddhism over to the Continental phenomenologists as 
a friendly conversation partner.  When we get to issues of ordering life, where the millennium-
old debates between Buddhists and Neo-Confucians take shape, we would need to look at the 
approaches to morals that relate Continental and pragmatic approaches, as I will at the end of this 
paper.   
 Now, however, I want to pick up on a specific kind of interpretive interaction that is most 
profitably understood in term of the Confucian tradition of ritual analysis.  Although ancient 
beyond accounting and anticipated articulately in Confucius’ Analects, Confucians understand 
ritual in a fundamental ontological sense to supplement the material forces of nature (qi) and the 
ordering principles of Heaven )li).  The classical slogan hails the ontological “trinity” of Heaven, 
Earth, and the Human. Xunzi pointed out that people have bodies with many material capacities 
and also emotional and intellectual capacities deriving from the source of coherence and 
intelligence.16  Moreover, humans have a psycho-physical governing capacity that can take 
control of actions.  But neither the material forces of physical properties nor the naturally given 
capacities for emotional response can tell us what is worth hating and loving, emulating or 
fleeing, fearing and trusting.  The biological capacity to control our actions does not by itself, 
10 
 
without education, tell us what to control and for what purpose.  In addition to Heaven and Earth, 
Xunzi gave metaphysical primacy also to Humanity, by which he meant the development of 
conventional ritualized meaning with cogent signs.  These conventional interpretive rituals are 
habits, as the pragmatists say, and include, among many other things, learned ways of standing 
and moving, gesturing meaningfully, talking in the semiotic structure of some language, habits of 
family and personal interactions, as well as more obviously ceremonial rituals.  I have elaborated 
in detail this pragmatic-Confucian theory of ritual, connecting pragmatic semiotics with ritual 
theory, in my Normative Cultures, which contains in its seventh chapter a long letter from 
Professor Cheng commenting on it.17 
 Not all rituals are plays among people. Some of our rituals focus mainly on the natural 
environment exclusive of human beings and social institutions. When gravity causes us to fall, 
that by itself is not a ritualized interaction with nature.  But as soon as an infant learns to 
interpret the pull of gravity and develops habits of throwing his toys high and attempting to 
stand, the interactions with gravity are ritualized.  Most rituals are learned with some kind of 
imitation.  Infants imitate their elders’ ways of standing.  For instance, most East Asians learn to 
stand with their feet parallel whereas Northern Europeans stand with their toes a bit angled out. 
When a cancer starts growing in us without being noticed, that is a non-ritualized interaction 
with nature.  But when we interpret how we feel as sickness and go to a doctor, thus discovering 
the cancer, the interaction with the cancer is ritualized.  Cultures differ in the ways they ritualize 
illness.  When the tiger in the bush did not make a telltale sound and simply pounced on the 
walker for dinner, the walker was not ritually interacting with the tiger.  But the tiger perhaps 
was hunting with ritualized habits; perhaps tigers in different families ritually hunt differently. If 
a person were walking by the bush on the alert for tigers, and failing to escape because our 
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rituals for jungle-walking don’t pick up on wholly silent tigers, we still were ritually engaged 
with the tiger.  
A great many of our interactions inclusive of people and social institutions are ritually 
shaped for better or worse. Among the most important things in our natural environment are 
other people and all the social institutions and organizations of our lives.  The Confucian 
tradition has always seen human individuals and social realities as interacting parts of the 
environment, specifications of nature while also being of human composition. What is especially 
striking in the Confucian understanding of ritual is that nearly everything we do is made possible 
by learned, that is, ritualized behavior.  Talking with friends we are already engaging in rituals of 
balance against the force of gravity, rituals of greeting, rituals of language speaking, and rituals 
of conversational interaction, all at once.  That we speak in a common language does not tell us 
exactly what to say, though we might also have rituals that direct the conversation to certain 
topics. The rituals that are explicit ceremonies, say in politics or religion, themselves are made 
possible only by the vast web of rituals in which the ceremonies take place.  We Confucians 
focus on being in healthy ritual interactions with other people at all levels of civilization. 
The Western intellectual traditions tend to distinguish between individual actions, 
institutional operations, and natural things that behave according to non-personal laws of nature.  
Modern Western thought has sometimes been attracted to mechanistic conceptions of nature 
apart from institutions and human intentions; since the 19th century, mechanistic thought has 
been replaced by statistical senses of natural causation.  Some early modern thinkers such as 
Thomas Hobbes have attempted to give mechanistic interpretations to social institutions and 
even to human choice.  Max Weber’s notion of the ideal type tries to predict human behavior as 
if behavior moves according to what would be predicted in a rational system.  Neither 
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Continental phenomenology nor any Chinese philosophy of which I know has attempted to treat 
human institutions and individual behavior in a mechanistic way, although of course both give 
great encouragement to predicting the future. 
In contrast to the Western modernity and postmodernity, both pragmatism and Chinese 
philosophy see individual human action and interaction, through the matrix or the web of rituals 
internalized and connecting individuals to other things, to be interpenetrated by ritualized 
institutions and all other forms of causal interaction.  Nature, institutions, and individual agents 
are not three distinct spheres but overlapping and interpenetrating layers of different kinds of 
natural processes. 
 
III. The Self in Three Parts 
 Rituals of all sorts are somewhat vague forms that need to be made specific in order 
actually to be played.  This is somewhat like the distinction prominent in Continental semiotics 
between a language and actually speaking in the language, which would be like the distinction 
between a ritual as a complex of habit-potentials and actually playing the ritual. Rituals are like 
dance steps: they are vague patterns and within each pattern there are many different specific 
ways they can be played. The vagueness (a technical notion in Peirce) of the steps means that 
they can be specified in different ways, perhaps even contradictory ways, by different players or 
even by the same player on different occasions. A person learning a ritual, like one learning a 
dance, can play or dance the ritual many different ways at first, perhaps not even noting how 
different the specifications are from one another. 
 As a dancer becomes more expert, however, the different specifications within the pattern 
become less random and more individuated.  In time, the dancing becomes this individual’s way 
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of dancing the pattern, distinct from and likely recognizable in contrast to the ways other dancers 
do the steps.  Likewise with rituals.  Though the ritual can be played by any individual in many 
ways, as they mature individuals individuate themselves more and more.  The mature 
individuating of ritual playing is a large part of how we become individual selves.  A small child 
can learn some large set of role-plays for treating mother and father.  But by late adolescence 
most people can play those ritual roles so as to relate to their own specific mother and father, and 
do so as to express their own individuated ways of playing those roles that might be played quite 
differently by siblings.   
A significant part of the human self, although not the only part, is the individuating of 
role playing.  (I’ll introduce two other parts shortly.) A mature individual is involved in playing a 
gazillion ritual roles all at once. Each self is a matrix (read yin) of ritual intersections and also the 
extensions of activity to play rituals overlapping within that matrix that individually reach out to 
interactions perhaps far distant from other rituals within the matrix (read yang). The rituals for 
relating to colleagues at work overlap those for relating to family members, but they also extend 
out in non-overlapping ways.  Confusions about this can be embarrassing, if not disastrous.  My 
wife once said in a fit of pique, “I am not your secretary!”  And I have known colleagues (not 
Confucians, surely) whose secretary has said “I am not your wife!” I am playing a host of rituals 
on this panel.  Ed Casey and I have been friends since we were college classmates; for a while 
we both taught at Stony Brook where he was my department chair.  All these relations have a 
ritualized substance which he and I are playing together now.  Chung-ying and I have been 
friends almost as long and he graciously has developed rituals that moved me in to the 
community of Chinese and American Confucian scholars, publishing many of my papers and 
setting me up to play the scholar-official role of president of the sponsoring organization of this 
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panel, the International Society for Chinese Philosophy. He and I have shared many more panels 
than Ed and I, and have a very rich set of mutually supportive academic performance rituals. I 
have known young Dr. Gu a much shorter time, but two of her major doctoral professors, Steve 
Odin and Joseph Grange, were my own doctoral students and so she thinks of me through the 
rituals of me being her academic Doktor Grossvater. 
 One of the most important things to recognize about rituals such as these is that when 
people play together in rituals, they can relate to both others and themselves as equally role 
players. Instead of the modern Western primacy of self-and-other, the basic Confucian sense of 
self is to be related to other players of ritual roles as one among the many selves playing.  We 
can regard ourselves as being one among many players in any given ritual.  Or to put it 
differently, the concrete reality is the rituals being played and ready at hand for play.  Human 
beings conceive of themselves as ritual players among and with others, if they are alert to the 
rituals as such.  We can conceive of the other players as themselves matrices of multitudes of 
rituals, just like us, but unique in their own bevy of rituals and playing reciprocal roles to ours in 
the ritual at hand.  We see the others as working through the individuations of their ritual play 
just as we are, becoming more mature.  From the perspective of the ritual-play itself, not just 
from the conscious perspective of any subject-self within, all the players are viewed as players, 
including ourselves with the others. The fundamental frame is not me facing the others but rather 
all of us playing together.  This is the first part of the Confucian sense of self that I want to 
stress. 
 A second basic pragmatic Confucian part of the self comes from the observation that each 
of us has at our core a capacity to perceive and respond to the value-laden things around us, to 
the Ten Thousand things, as Confucians call the world.  Each individual is a continuum from the 
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inner elements of response through bodily functions, postures, and actions to being able to 
perceive and act across space and time to connect with the other things.18  Those abilities require 
the individual to develop language and other sets of symbols for parsing out the objects in the 
foreground of their environmental background, as well as interpretive knowledge, skills at 
moving through the natural and social environments, and many other things.  Confucians 
emphasize the very great importance of learning so as to be able to perceive distant things 
through helpful theories and practical habits, and to act will.  Sometimes Western 
phenomenologists think that the perceived world is simply given, “there” in consciousness or in 
experience to be analyzed.  Nevertheless, consider how anyone from any culture can listen to 
Bach and find it interesting, perhaps pleasurable; but someone from the Chinese musical 
tradition would find it less comprehensible than a Westerner who recognizes its harmonies; and 
then note that someone with a highly refined musical conservatory education in Bach would hear 
much more than those of us whose musical education is at the entertainment level.  It is not that 
the musicologist hears the same thing as us amateurs and can analyze it better.  The musicologist 
actually hears things we amateurs miss.  Perception is an achievement that requires learning. In 
many ways, becoming a mature self so as to relate well and responsibly to the Ten Thousand 
Things is like becoming a martial artist, learning to sense and bear the eddies in the qi.  
The importance of ritual here is that my own personal self includes all the rituals I learn 
to play.  Because the rituals, including speaking my language, intrinsically include the other 
people and things who reciprocally play them, the others are part of my own individual self.  I 
am all sorts of rituals shared with others: in many places in my life, I am We.  All the things 
playing ritual roles with me are in various senses components of my personal continua of 
connections with the things of the world. So, the Western ideal for the individual, to be a 
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subjective self over against and in relation to objective Others and the world, is hard to register 
on my Confucian model.  Western sociologists and anthropologists often think that East Asians 
put the group or community ahead of the individual.  But that simply is to misread the Confucian 
metaphysics of selfhood. 
 Yet a third part of the Confucian self is what the tradition calls “sincerity” or cheng.  
Sincerity is the educational ideal of becoming transparent through all the layers of the continuum 
each person has with the things of the world.  It means eliminating selfishness that might distort 
perception and response. But it also means untangling our emotions that hide our motives from 
others and ourselves. It means practicing ritual play that relates properly to the ritual components 
and situation.  It means learning how to be “present” to others in ritual play and elsewhere.  It 
even means dressing right to indicate what you honestly think and feel about others and yourself.  
For some people, how they dress is a device to protect themselves and deceive others.  For other 
people, how they dress is meant to “express” themselves.  But for Confucians, how we dress is 
an attempt to be deferential to others and to ourselves, openly showing our regard with sincerity.  
Because so many relations are ritualized, often dress is coded for the ritual, and dressing 
according to code shows whether one is conforming or not, and thus showing sincerity in 
engaging the ritual as such.  But even more, how we dress is an attempt to be respectful and 
vulnerable at once, without hidden agendas. 
 The English word “sincerity” often has the connotation of expressing oneself honestly, 
not holding back our feelings, “letting it all hang out,” to use a phrase that for some signifies a 
virtue.  The Chinese word “cheng” that is translated “sincerity” has a slightly different 
connotation.  It means first having developed the skills to appreciate other people for who they 
are, our institutions for the good they make possible, and surrounding nature for its many worths.  
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Then it means clearing up the continua of interactions that connect us with those others so that 
we can respond appropriately.  Confucian sincerity is a clarity or transparency between the Ten 
Thousand Things and our inner heart with its natural openness to appropriate response.  
Becoming sincere means working on oneself, yet the ground for working on oneself is not 
oneself but rather the nature and values of other things with which we interact.  Sincerity in the 
Confucian sense is not expressing oneself without disguise but rather making oneself 
appropriately responsive to the things in the world whose nature and value need to be discovered 
and appreciated. 
 Sincerity is the deepest existential virtue for us Boston Confucians because it is so very 
hard to attain and failure in it is a form of existential self-contradiction.  The ancient fault of 
Confucianism, for which it has been criticized by Daoists from the beginning, is that the 
emphasis on ritual can degenerate into mere formalism.  When sincerity is lacking, thus is what 
happens.  An insincere person can even individuate much role playing, or at least develop an 
individuated style.  Sometimes insincere phonies can deceive many people, though we usually 
can detect a bad smell.   
Confucian rituals historically have been criticized for being oppressive, with men 
degrading women, the rich oppressing the poor, mothers-in-law enslaving their daughters in law.  
This should be impossible if the men, the rich, and the mothers-in-law were truly sincere as they 
played the rituals with their potential victims.  In each of these instances, sincerity requires true 
respect and appreciation of the others involved in the ritual, and ritual-play that cannot be played 
sincerely ought not be played.  But who can completely purge selfishness, straighten out their 
emotions, play rituals rightly, always be humanly attentive, or afford a proper wardrobe?  We 
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can always make progress; the Confucians say this potential for progress lies even in “small 
people.”  But almost inevitably, despite sometimes making progress, failure blunts selfhood.   
Confucians thus have a deep sensibility of tragedy.  Partly this is because sincerity is so 
hard to attain, and even then seems to be a vagrant and ephemeral trait.  This is only part of the 
reason for the Confucian tragic view, however.   
The other part is that many of the rituals we play are corrupt and bad. Many of the 
traditional Confucian household rituals have such unevenness of power that women simply 
cannot be respected sincerely, the poor cannot be engaged by the rich with sincerity, and 
mothers-in-law cannot run their daughters-in-law’s family with true sincerity. Those rituals need 
to be changed.  In our own time, think of all the rituals that carry on racism, or worsen a 
dysfunctional family, or sabotage a social institution, or promote war, or desecrate an 
environment, or keep certain people in oppressive poverty.  In so many places there is an obvious 
need to change the rituals we have.  On the one hand, Confucius and Xunzi were right that, 
without appropriate rituals, children cannot be reared, family life is impossible, and the body 
politic is a chaos of the strong against the weak.  So Confucian said we need to recover the 
rituals of the Sage Emperors on antiquity that made high civilization possible in the first place. 
But on the other hand, once we have some rituals, this does not guarantee that they are the right 
rituals.  The right rituals are those than can be played with sincerity.  Sincerity is the touchstone 
for judging rituals.  We need to remember that sincerity requires learned appreciation of the Ten 
Thousand Things, particularly other people, and the cultivation of one’s own sagehood of 
transparent appropriate behavior in the environment. 
The need to change our rituals for the sake of sincere deference for all involved is at the 
heart of Confucian morals. To be sure, Confucian ethics includes learning some moral virtues in 
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order to be sincere. The recent emphasis by Roger Ames on “role ethics” rather than internal 
virtues appreciates the pervasiveness of rituals in the Confucian understanding of the self and 
others. But I believe that even more important than these well-recognized themes of Confucian 
morals is the imperative for active ritual analysis and the correction of bad rituals.  Better than 
most cultures, Confucianism is sensitive to ritual and can point out how our lives operate by 
rituals that need to be understood as such. Whereas many cultures think that social relations, 
including power relations and class distinctions are “natural,” we should understand them as 
being ritualized all the way through, although of course not reduced to rituals alone as some 
“social constructivists” are likely to say.  So we can learn from Confucianism to put great 
emphasis on analyzing and reconceiving our global societies in terms of their ritual structures, 
and judiciously criticizing them from the standpoint of their justice.  For this, Confucians need to 
lighten up on their attention to the past, recovering a great history after a century of suppression. 
Instead we need to look outward and to the future to facilitate an appreciation of our 
institutionalized rituals with an eye to changing them. 
Changing rituals, however, is very difficult. We late-moderns hope that changing laws 
will do it.  But the experience in America of changing the civil rights laws shows that this has 
helped the African American middle class but has done little for the African-American 
underclass who are still in bondage to rituals of self-hate, economic self-destructiveness, and 
dysfunctional civic life.  It is those deeper rituals that need to be changed.  Confucius thought in 
his own time that presenting the rituals of the Sage Kings could help the problem; most scholars 
today believe he just made them up, his protestations of merely passing on traditions 
notwithstanding.  Through much of Chinese history, it was believed that emulation of a wise 
Emperor, or a good grandfather, could develop improved rituals.  Sometimes it seems today that 
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the most helpful models to emulate are athletes.  Can we not do better?  The great Confucian 
contribution for our time needs to be the invention and deployment of rituals that make for 
peace, freedom, resolution of conflict between genuinely contradictory interests, and human 
flourishing.  Strange, this sounds like John Dewey, does it not? 
Even when we have to play those rituals we must, our play should be oriented to 
changing the rituals themselves; and yet so often we seem to be forced to reinforce the bad 
elements.   Perhaps most tragic is the fact that we do not now have the rituals that allow 
ourselves and our nations to interact peacefully and resolve disputes without war, injustice, 
economic suffering, or pitting the strong against the weak.  One of the great advantages of many 
rituals is that they allow people who have directly conflicting interests and who hate one another 
to cooperate in the ritual dance so as to get something done, for instance run an economy or a 
household.  You don’t have to like your ritual partners in order to play the ritual with them that 
accomplishes something.  Our world, like Confucius’s, simply lacks the well-practiced rituals 
that allow for the settling of large economic, political, and military disputes.   
Pragmatic-Confucian phenomenology of Peirce’s sort is not a descriptive examination of 
consciousness but rather an analytical classification of the kinds of things that need to be 
harmonized for high civilization.  The value of those classes is that they point out some of the 
tasks of ritual formation, as well as the difficulties of harmonizing what we simply cannot 
imagine how to fit together.  Nevertheless, some things can be fixed.  The Confucian approach to 
tragedy, like the pragmatist, is to feel it in the heart as sincerely as possible, lament what has 
happened, and then get on and try to do better next time. Pragmatic Confucians do not expect 
victory, only the opportunity to do the best we can on our watch, educated to appreciate both the 
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vast and deep values as well as the pervasive injustices in our environment.  Philosophy is not 
just for description but for learning to appreciate and renovate. 
Robert Cummings Neville 
Boston University 
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